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Since the early 2000s a dramatic rise in institutional investment in agricultural futures markets 
has occurred.  This rise may have caused an increase in price volatility, potentially resulting in 
added risk for farmers, agribusinesses, and consumers.  Currently, regulators, hedgers, 
exchanges, and speculators lack information regarding how modern investments in agricultural 
futures markets affect short-term price volatility.  The objective of this analysis is to examine the 
effect of institutional investment on short-term price volatility for corn and soybean futures 
markets. Using daily price data for corn and soybean futures from the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT), several measures of price volatility – including differences, ratios, and measures of 
central tendency – are calculated and their results compared by Akaike’s Information Criteria 
(AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC).  Using the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission’s (CFTC) Commitments of Traders (COT) weekly Aggregated Futures and Options 
Combined report for corn and soybeans, a percent of open interest held by noncommercial 
traders is used to estimate movements in institutional investment.  In order to account for the 
dependence of price on recent prices and the dependence of the variance of price on recent 
variances of price, a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) model is used in this analysis.  Portmanteau Q Tests and Engle’s LM tests are used to 
justify this approach.  We find for each model the effect of institutional investment on price 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural commodities futures markets have long had two primary purposes: i) price 
discovery and ii) reducing the risk inherent in buying and selling commodities under changing 
market conditions.  Through the futures and options markets, hedgers (or physical market 
participants) can reduce the uncertainty in return on investment.  Hedging, as opposed to 
speculating, is the primary purpose of the agricultural futures markets (Arthur, 1966; p.230).  
Hedgers buy and sell commodity derivatives to protect against changes in the price of the 
physical commodity, while speculators buy and sell commodity derivatives for the purpose of 
earning money on the derivative.  Speculators hold the critical role of providing liquidity, 
increasing the likelihood there will be a seller for every buyer and a buyer for every seller 
(Szafarz, 2012) and providing to the market more opinions regarding the most appropriate price.  
Speculators purchase or sell financial derivatives based on expectations of future prices 
accompanied by an equivalent, opposite, future transaction of the derivative.  Speculators do this 
without offsetting activity in the underlying physical market (Kohlhagen, 1979; p. 323) and 
without the intention of owning the physical commodity.  One category of speculators is 
institutional investment.  While definitions for institutional investment vary, it can be very 
broadly thought of as a category comprised of large speculative traders.   
While institutional investors have had a presence in agricultural futures markets since the 
markets’ inception, the “financialization” of commodity futures is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in which the futures markets have become media for investment and traded 
similarly to debt and equity markets (Tang and Xiong, 2012; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2014).  
According to both studies, financialization of commodities has tied their price activity more 




belonging to one of two categories:  those that take only long positions and those that take long 
and/or short positions.  Long-only speculators can take positions in a number of commodities, 
adjust the size of their longs to fit their forecasts, and many times make public the fund’s weights 
by commodity (Irwin and Sanders 2011).  Index funds are a common example of long-only 
speculators.  Long-and-short speculators can take long and/or short positions, can take positions 
in a number of commodities, and generally do not make their compositions public (Irwin and 
Sanders 2011, p. 523).  Hedge funds, commodity trading advisors (CTA), and Commodity Pool 
Operators (CPO) are of this category.  Both long-only and long-and-short speculators are – in 
contract to physical market participants – subject to positions limits by the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission
1
 (CFTC, 2015b).  Both long-only and long-and-short speculators can trade 
futures, options, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and swaps.  For this reason, either long-
only or long-and-short speculators can affect short-term price volatility. Institutional investment 
is the moniker of large speculators of both varieties.   
According to Barclay Capital estimates, institutional investors have dramatically 
increased shares of open interest (OI) and volume since the early 2000s (Sanders and Irwin, 
2011; Tang and Xiong, 2012).  Not only has total OI risen in corn and soybean markets over the 
18 years considered (Figure 1) but the share of OI held by institutional investors has risen in corn 
(Figure 2) and soybeans (Figure 3).  As articles such as Stoll and Whaley (2011) attest, times of 
dramatic price changes – especially price increases – seem to encourage more than the usual 
amount of attention on institutional investors.  If a shift has occurred in the treatment of 
agricultural commodities markets away from the minimization of risk and price discovery toward 
the allocation of capital, several parties would hold an interest in it.  Farmers and end-users (e.g., 
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food processors and ethanol producers) would hold an interest in the risk management efficacy 
of a futures contract (Arthur, 1966); regulators, in an increased use of more opaque transaction 
methods (Stout 1999); exchanges, in the limits to jurisdiction over the type of instrument traded 
(Donohue 2014); and consumers, in the stability of food prices.  
As of May 21, 2015, #2 yellow corn and #2 yellow soybeans traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) together comprised 53% of total agricultural commodities OI 
(CME Group, 2015).  As the most frequently traded agricultural commodities on the CME, corn 
and soybean markets may provide a proxy for all commodities in the study of a shift in market 
treatment.  It is reasonable to ask if institutional investment is affecting short-term price volatility 
because as of writing (May 21, 2015) it accounts for 49% of total OI in Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) corn markets and 52% of the total OI in CBOT soybeans markets, using the CFTC 
Commitments of Traders (COT) noncommerical category as its proxy.  The increase in these 
shares has coincided with the increase in short-term price volatility over the past 20 years.  The 
causal mechanisms for this effect might be the increased linkages between commodities and 
equities, the larger trade denominations of institutional investors versus other trader types, and/or 
the market power afforded a trader type with such a large market share.  The research objective 
of this paper is to discover whether the share of total OI held by institutional investors affects 
short-term price volatility.  To accomplish this, regressions were constructed of several measures 
of price volatility on institutional investment’s share of OI.  Each regression’s null hypothesis 
was that institutional investment had no effect.  This paper contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge by using data of both before and after the early 2000s’ rise in institutional 




the data through a framework that accounts for both the autoregressive and the conditionally 





CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Existing literature reflects concern over the effect of an increase in OI by institutional 
investors on commodities futures prices since the early 2000s (Sanders and Irwin 2011; Tang and 
Xiong 2012).   Studies can be grouped into three broad types of investigation into institutional 
investment’s effect on market prices:  i) changes in future price value; ii) changes in futures price 
volatility; and iii) changes in cross-market price effects.  The fourth and final subsection of the 
Literature Review describes the data used in existing literature. 
Futures Price Value 
The first broad type of investigation analyzes whether institutional investment is causing 
futures prices to overestimate the fundamental value of commodities and includes examinations 
into the nature and history of bubbles (Gilbert, 2010; Capell-Blancard and Coulibaly, 2011).  The 
idea that futures prices are experiencing increases as a result of an inundation of investment 
money was championed by Michael Masters in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2008) and his testimony before the CFTC 
(2009) and Masters and White (2014).  While Masters’ and Masters and White’s claims have not 
been widely accepted by the academic community (Sanders and Irwin 2012; Buyuksahin and 
Robe 2014), debate continues over both methods and results. Sanders and Irwin’s (2012) review 
concludes that while some studies find in favor of Masters (2008) most find against it.  In 
addition, studies using the Granger causality test, such as Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin (2009), fail 
to find a causal link between institutional investment and overvaluation of futures.  Acharya, 
Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013, p. 442) state, “Limits on the risk-taking capacity of speculators 
imply that aggregate producer hedging impacts futures prices adversely from the producers’ 




net long positions are positively (negatively) correlated with positive price changes, though they 
find traders’ position lag price changes.   
Futures Price Volatility 
The second broad type of investigation includes studies into changes in futures price 
volatility. These studies address the issues of how quickly and in what magnitudes futures prices 
rise or fall.   
The effect of hedge funds on futures price volatility is addressed by Holt and Irwin 
(2004) through data of futures prices and both hedge funds and commodity trading advisors 
(CTA), both of which take long and/or short positions.  Their data were collected from a six-
month period during 1994, approximately 10 years before the rise in institutional investment’s 
presence.  The study concludes that when funds are profitable (which in aggregate they were, 
over the six-month period) they decrease market volatility by trading on valuable private 
information.   
Chang, Pinegar, and Schachter (1997) address short-term price changes resulting from 
large speculative traders.  The data used were from trades occurring between 1983 and 1990, 
well before the increase in institutional investment.  Hamilton and Wu (2015) use current data 
but exclude hedge funds, CTAs, CPOs, and all other long-and-short speculators.  A study 
contemporary to Hamilton and Wu’s (2014) was performed by Miffre and Brooks (2013) via the 
use of portfolio mimicry, the reconstruction of a portfolio to study its behavior under different 
market conditions.  They analyze price volatility over varying time periods, comparing volatility 
of price within the intervals of one-month, three-months, six-months, and one-year. Approaching 
the issue of price volatility from a purpose of analyzing a method of investing, as they do, calls 




commodities futures.  If, alternatively, the research interest is in examining the short-term price 
changes of a market, a more appropriate method is to hold the portfolio’s holdings constant 
throughout the period of analysis. 
Gilbert and Pfuderer (2014) find that while there is no Granger causality of investment on 
price, there is instrumental variable contemporary causality of investment on price, especially if 
only index funds are considered.  DeLong et al. (1990) find that the price volatility in the stock 
market is increased due to positive feedback trading, a dynamic possibly attributable to 
institutional investment.  Liu et al. (2014) find a causal relationship:  bullish and bearish news of 
equal magnitudes cause market price adjustments of different magnitudes.  Kristoufek and 
Vosvrda (2014) find the corn futures markets are of average efficiency among a group of 25 
energy, metal, and agricultural commodities, using the Efficiency Index introduced by 
Kristoufek and Vosvrda (2013).   
The issue of whether speculation stabilizes prices is also approached from a theoretical 
perspective.  If all agents are rational and have the same information, Hart and Kreps (1986) 
show that speculation can, but not necessarily will, lead to less stable prices.  The results are 
equally applicable to futures markets as they are to physical markets.  While the implication of 
their findings is that further regulation on speculation is not necessary, they conclude that the 
assumptions necessary to allow their model to stabilize prices are far stronger than those that 
allow for the possibility of speculation not stabilizing prices.  From their research the theoretical 
results of speculation on price stability are not clear.  However, the conclusion reached by 
Barber, Lee and Odean (2014) that institutional investors are profitable allows researchers to 
make an important assumption about stability, articulated by Friedman (1953, p. 175), “People 




to saying that speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing in general only if 
speculators on the average sell when the currency is low in price and buy when it is high.”  
Cross-market Price Effects 
Both of the two broad types of investigation outlined above build on the prerequisite to 
institutional investment’s involvement, the financialization of commodities, a relatively recent 
phenomenon in commodities markets described by Irwin and Sanders (2012) and Tang and 
Xiong (2012). The financialization of commodities and commodities’ subsequent inclusion as an 
investable asset class has widened the investment opportunities for fund managers.  Cross-
market spillover of price volatility illustrates the fund managers’ new investment opportunities.  
That the increase in financialization of commodities coincides with the increase in inter-market 
price correlations suggests that money managers are increasingly considering commodities a 
substitute for traditional investments, such as debt and equities (Tang and Xiong, 2012).  The 
effect of cross-market linkages on how institutional investors affect agricultural price volatility is 
still largely under academic development.   
One approach to examining institutional investment’s effects on price dispersion from the 
perspective of fund managers is to compare the behavior of the prices of traditional investment 
classes to the prices of the emerging investment classes.  Tang and Xiong (2012) find evidence 
for the spillover of oil’s price volatility into non-oil commodities’ price volatility around the 
increased oil price volatility of 2008.  Crucial to the conceptual framework of this paper, they 
find institutional investors cause oil and non-energy markets to become more correlated, 
particularly in commodities markets included in either the Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs 




While their research emphasizes the investment implications, it provides an anchoring 
point for investigation into institutional investment’s effects.  Investigations into the correlation 
between price movements of agricultural commodities markets and of equities markets such as 
those by Buyuksahin and Robe (2014) are similarly particular to the literature on investment 
strategies.  Buyuksahin and Robe (2014), while informing research on institutional investment’s 
effects on market efficiency, do not address a potential causal relationship between the 
proportion of OI held by institutional investors and price volatility in a single commodity market.  
Data in Existing Literature 
The CFTC’S COT report has been used by Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo (2004).  
Specifically, they used the COT category of noncommercial traders to proxy for speculation.  
The Commodity Index Traders (CIT) report, a supplement to the COT, was used by Capelle-
Blancard and Coulibaly (2011) and Tang and Xiong (2012).  The latter article uses net long 
positions in each commodity to proxy for index trading.  Net long positions calculated from the 
managed money category of the CIT report, along with rare daily institutional investors’ position 
data, are used by Holt and Irwin (2004).  The CIT report was the original title for the 
Supplemental Commitments of Traders (SCOT) report, which is used by Hamilton and Wu 
(2015) and Stoll and Whaley (2011); under each name it suffers largely the same problems as the 
COT report.  Holt and Irwin (2004) compare CIT and non-public data of rare daily institutional 
investment positions across 13 markets to daily price data across the same markets.  While they 
focus on precisely the type of data needed to address short-term changes in futures prices 
resulting from institutional investors’ presence, their definition of speculation and their time 
period of observation do not allow their work to answer the proposed research question.  They 




and pension funds, which comprise a significant portion of OI, volume, and public concern (Holt 
and Irwin, 2004; CFTC, 2014).  More significantly, the CFTC data they use cover only a six-
month period in 1994 (April 4, 1994 to October 6, 1994). 
Chang, Pinegar, and Schachter (1997), which use data of the change in long positions and 
the change in short positions and data of large speculator volume from the CFTC’s ‘01’ data, 
suffer the same problem as Holt and Irwin (2004):  both studies use data periods that pre-date the 
financialization of commodities, the dramatic rise in percent of noncommercial OI and volume in 
commodities markets, and the subsequent increasing cross-market linkages among commodities, 
equities, and debt.  The distinction between the pre- and post-early-2000s time periods is 
important because noncommercial traders had very low shares of OI and volume before the early 
2000s (Sanders and Irwin, 2011; Tang and Xiong, 2012), and as studies on the increasing role of 
cross-market price linkages suggest (Tang and Xiong, 2012; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2014), the 
behavior of today’s managed money may be substantively different from the managed money of 
20 years ago.  
Sanders and Irwin (2012) use CFTC’s Index Investment Data (IID), which disaggregates 
the long and short positions of each firm.  The COT report calculates only net long positions 
disaggregated by firm.  They state their preference for the IID report as due to the confidence 
placed in it by their personal contacts in the CFTC and investment banks and the confidence 
placed in it by “a well-known private firm that has been tracking such investments for more than 
a decade.”  However, IID only began to be assembled and released in 2008 and was for a time 
reported only quarterly.  
Three primary data constraints exist regarding short-term changes in price and short-term 




hedging and speculating activities, ii) the data precede the rise of noncommercial OI, and iii) the 
frequency of data on noncommercial OI is less than daily.  Existing literature that focuses on 
institutional investment does not focus on agricultural commodities data, post-financialization 






CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODS 
Data for our analysis were obtained from two sources:  the CFTC and the CME.  The 
CFTC’s COT Futures-and-Options Combined reports from 1995 to 2013 provided weekly OI for 
corn and soybeans by firm type. Daily corn and soybean settlement prices for futures contracts at 
the CME were collected, and a single daily weighted average price was estimated for each 
commodity.  The following three subsections outline the CFTC data, the CME data, and the 
GARCH framework used in our study. 
CFTC’s COT Futures-and-Options Combined Reports  
In order to make claims about intra-daily or daily changes in institutional investors’ 
presence, a study would need to include trade-level data of all – or at least one – institutional 
investors.  In such a study, the analysis could measure the change in price volatility after a single, 
particular trade.  This is the approach of Granger Causality.  Because such data is not publicly 
available it may be necessary to take a step back, view the relationship of institutional investment 
and price volatility on a larger time scale, and ask how short-term price volatility before the rise 
of institutional investment differs from short-term price volatility after the rise.  This is the 
approach of structural analysis.  However, without being able to identify an a priori causal 
mechanism for a structural change, this element of the conceptual framework with the greatest 
scientific integrity may be to assume a smooth effect over time and choose data and models 
accordingly.   
The CFTC’S COT reports are released weekly and provide a breakdown of each 
Tuesday’s OI for future contracts in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to or above 
the reporting levels
2
 established by the CFTC (CFTC, 2015a).  The COT reports list OI by firm 
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type, as opposed to trading activity.  Under the categories of the COT report, firm type can be 
commercial, noncommercial, or nonreportable and are determined by what the CFTC judges the 
general purpose of the firm to be.  If the CFTC judges a firm to participate in the futures markets 
largely for the purpose of hedging physical market activities, it designates the firm as 
commercial.  If the CFTC judges a firm to participate in the futures markets largely for another 
purpose, it designates the firm as noncommercial. Nonreportable firms are firms that maintain 
position limits below the reporting levels established by the CFTC. To clarify, a given firm can 
participate in multiple types of trading activities (i.e., hedging and speculation), but the COT 
assigns the firm a single designation (i.e., commercial or noncommercial).  As such, a firm can 
use this limitation of the CFTC’s reporting to obfuscate its type of trading, allowing it to avoid 
the burdensome regulations applicable to speculators (Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo, 2004).  
Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo (2004, p. 430) explain, "[B]ecause of the speculative position 
limits placed on noncommercials, there is some incentive for traders to classify themselves as 
commercials. Also, since cash positions for true commercials are unknown, their positions may 
be speculative in nature."  In this analysis we use the COT noncommercial trader’s category to 
represent institutional investment, recognizing that some traders classified as commercial or 
nonreportable may also be speculative.  
The CFTC’S COT aggregated report – the version of the COT used in our study – divides 
noncommercial OI into long, short, and spread positions (Figures 4 and 5) and divides 
commercial and nonreporting OI each into long or short positions.  Following Sanders, Boris, 
and Manfredo (2004), Equation 1 explains the total open interest as reported on the COT report: 





TOI  is total OI as reported on the COT report; 
NCL   is the long OI positions held by noncommercial traders; 
NCS   is the short OI positions held by noncommercial traders; 
NCSP  is the spreading OI positions held by noncommercial traders; 
CL   is the long OI positions held by commercial traders; 
CS  is the short OI positions held by commercial traders; 
NRL  is the long OI positions held by nonreporting traders; 
NRS  is the short OI positions held by nonreporting traders; 
A shortcoming of these metrics in the examination of institutional investment’s effect on 
price volatility is that the category of noncommercial includes large, independent speculators as 
well as institutional investors.  Data from weekly CFTC’s COT reports from 1995 to 2013 were 
used to estimate noncommercial OI as a percentage of total OI (Equation 2). The date range was 
chosen to provide data before and after the rise in soybean and corn futures and options OI held 
by noncommercial traders. 
(2)  𝑁𝐶𝑂𝐼 = 100 ∙
𝑁𝐶𝐿+𝑁𝐶𝑆+2∗𝑁𝐶𝑆𝑝
2∗𝑇𝑂𝐼
     
where 
  NCOI  is the percent of all open interest held by noncommercial traders;  
  NCL   is the long open interest positions held by noncommercial traders;  
  NCS   is the shorts held by noncommercial traders;  
  NCSp   is the spreads held by noncommercial traders; 






CME Corn and Soybean Futures Prices 
Because futures contracts of a commodity are specified by particular delivery periods, 
there is not a single price for either corn or soybeans futures contracts for any given day.  In 
order to capture as much information about price as possible, multiple contract months are 
considered.  Particularly in examining the effects of institutional investment, considering 
multiple contract months can be beneficial because it may account for calendar spreads.  
Calendar spreads, also called simply spreads, often constitute a majority of institutional 
investment’s position, as Figure 4 shows for corn and Figure 5 shows for soybeans.  Daily corn 
and soybean futures prices from the CME, from 1995 to 2013, were used to estimate a single 
daily weighted average price for each commodity (Equation 3).  For each commodity, the 
weighted average price reflects each futures contract’s daily settlement price, weighted by the 
percentage of total OI for that futures contract.  For example, if on February 10
th
 the March corn 
contract constituted one third of all corn contracts’ OI, the March contract’s settlement price 
would contribute one third of the weighted average price for that day.  Price data for each 
commodity and contract were collected from barchart.com for the last two years of each 
contract’s life (372-454 trading days with an average of 405 trading days).  If a contract were to 
be traded, say, three years prior to its expiration, the prices of the first year (the year furthest 
from expiry) would not be captured in the weighted average price. The total number of contracts 
included in any given day’s weighted average price for corn is typically seven to 10 (minimum 
of one and maximum of 10) and for soybeans is typically eight to 14 (minimum of four and 
maximum of 14).  Weighted average price is defined in Equation 3 and graphed in Figure 6. 









Pc,s  is the price for commodity c on day s; 
SPc,s,i  is the settlement price for commodity c for contract i on day s; 
OIc,s,i  is the open interest for commodity c for contract i on day s; 
TOIc,s is the total open interest across all contracts for commodity c on 
day s;  
L is the number of contracts being traded for commodity c on day s. 
To more accurately depict the volatility in the change in price (Rc,s), shown in Figure 7, 
the absolute value of the change in price was taken (Equation 4 and Figure 8).  
(4)  𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑅𝑐,𝑠
 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑃𝑐,𝑠
 −  𝑃𝑐,𝑠−1
 )   
where 
absRc,s is absolute value of the average of daily changes in price 
for commodity c for day s; 
Pc,s is the average of daily prices for commodity c for day
3
 s; 
Pc,s-1 is the weighted average price for commodity c at the close 
of day s-1.   
To determine the normalized change in price, the absolute value of Rc,s was divided by 






    
where 
absNRc,s is the absolute value of the weekly change in price 
normalized by the price on day s for commodity c for day s; 
                                                          
3
 A week is not a trading week (i.e., Monday to Friday). It is the time interval covered by the 




absRc,s is the absolute change in weighted average price for 
commodity c for day s; 
Pc,s is the price for commodity c for day s; 
 The third measure of price volatility was the standard deviation of a running five-
day range (approximately one trading week) of the current and previous four days’ 
settlement prices (Equation 6 and Figure 10).  
(6)  𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑃𝑐,𝑠









 ])4𝑗=0    
where 
 stdevPc,s is the standard deviation of a running five-day range for 
commodity c on day s; 
Pc,s-i is the weighted average price for commodity c for day s-i 
(i=0…4); 
Pc,s-j is the weighted average price for commodity c for day s-j 
(j=0…4) 
The above price values are then rolled up into weekly values in order to reconcile the 
difference caused by CFTC data being offered weekly.  The rollup is achieved by way of a 
simple average of the daily price values into a single weekly price value.  This method avoids the 
loss of data fidelity that would result from ignoring daily price values.  A price volatility measure 
constructed with weekly price values is the ratio of weekly prices, given by Equation 7. 





  Pratioc,t is the ratio of price on week t to the price on week t-1 




The above-defined measurements of weighted average price will henceforth simply be 
called price.  Because of this, the term price will refer to week-level data (the average of the 
settlement price for each day in the week).  Price volatility will refer to a measure of the change 
in price by week.  To achieve normality of residuals the price measurements may be 
transformed.   
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
The generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) framework was 
introduced by Bollerslev (1986), who built upon the work of Engle (1982), who introduced the 
autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) framework to deal with the vagaries of 
financial market data in statistical analysis.  Specifically, the assumption of homoskedasticity 
(the non-constancy of residual distributions across time) often does not hold for financial data.  
There are times in financial markets filled with chaos and others of relative tranquility.  This 
volatility clustering spoils the assumption of homoskedasticity.  Engle’s solution was to define 
the sample variance conditioned on past values of all variables in terms of past values of the 
error term.  Bollerslev took the idea a step further by defining the error variance in terms of past 
error variances and past error terms.  GARCH has been used in numerous studies to model prices 
in financial markets, including by Miffre and Brooks (2013) and by Beckmann and Czudaj 
(2014) in the investigation of agricultural futures price.  A visual inspection of the change in 
price, the absolute change in price, and the absolute change in price normalized to current price 
levels suggest volatility clustering may be an issue for corn and soybeans futures for the years we 
considered (Figures 7, 8 and 9, respectively). 
The stationarity of the measures of price volatility is tested by the Dickey-Fuller Unit 




the regression equation.  Serial correlation of price volatility is tested for by the Durbin Watson 
statistic.  If serial correlation is found, an autoregressive component of an order(s) selected by 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is added to the 
model.  Homoskedasticity is tested by the Portmanteau Q test and by Engle’s LM test.  If the 
assumption of homoskedasticity does not hold, a model that accounts for differences in variances 
over time is used.  If autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are found in price volatility, a 
GARCH framework that estimates parameters by maximum likelihood procedures is used to 
model the relationship between price volatility and institutional investment.  Each GARCH 
model requires an order be specified, both for the autoregressive terms (p) and the conditional 
variance terms (q).  In the style of Sanders, Boris, & Manfredo (2004), GARCH order is 
determined by comparing each model’s AIC.  All combinations of orders p = {1,2,3,4} and q = 
{1,2,3,4} are compared, representing up to one month of history.  The order of the model that 
minimizes AIC is selected.  The comparison is made for each commodity for each dependent 
variable.  For robustness purposes, similar selections are made among GARCH orders using 
minimum SBC. If regressions of the above-defined measures of price volatility (Equations 4, 5, 
6, and 7) result in residuals that are not normally distributed, transformations of price volatility 
measures are taken and the regressions re-run.  For simplicity, the transformation of choice is a 
natural logarithm.  If that fails to produce normally distributed residuals, investigations are 
expanded to other transformations.  If multiple dependent variables in a single commodity 
produce normal residuals, AIC and SBC are again used to select the model of best fit so that a 
single model can be chosen to represent NCOI’s relationship to institutional investment for each 




The autoregressive component in GARCH accounts for the dependence of each time 
period’s dependent variable upon its previous value and follows the form 
(8)  𝑦𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑐,𝑡−1,𝑦𝑐,𝑡−2, … , 𝑦𝑐,𝑡−𝑝, ℎ𝑐,𝑡−𝑗, … , ℎ𝑐,𝑡−𝑞) 
where 
  y   is the measure of price volatility; 
 ℎ  is the conditional variance of the residuals; 
p is the maximum number of autoregressive dependent variable lags; 
q is the maximum number of conditional variance lags;  
c   is the commodity; and 
t is the week. 
The conditionally variance component accounts for the dependence of each time period’s error 
term upon its previous value(s) and follows the form 
(9)  ε𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑓(ε𝑐,𝑡−1,ε𝑐,𝑡−2, … , ε𝑐,𝑡−𝑞 , ℎ𝑐,𝑡−𝑗, … , ℎ𝑐,𝑡−𝑞) 
where 
   ε   is the error of the mean equation; 
h  is the conditional variance;  
p is the maximum number of autoregressive dependent variable lags; 
q is the maximum number of conditional variance lags;  
c   is the commodity;  and 
t  is the week. 
The mean equation is: 
(10)                   𝑦𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐,0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑐,𝑖𝑦𝑐,𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1





y   is the measure of price volatility; 
NCOI is the percent of total OI held by noncommerical traders; 
p   is the GARCH order;  
c   is the commodity; and  
t   is the week. 
As presented by Bollerslev (1986, p. 309), the GARCH model incorporates for each commodity 
a mean equation error term, ε, and a conditional error variance equation, ht given by: 
(11)  εt | 𝜓𝑡−1~ N(0, ℎ𝑡) 









  ℎ𝑡  is the conditional variance of the residuals at time t; 
  q  is the order of the GARCH component; 
p  is the maximum number of autoregressive lags of both the 
dependent variable and the conditional error variance; 
  𝜀𝑡  is the error of the mean equation at time t; and 
  𝜓𝑡  is the total information set at time t. 
𝑝 ≥ 0, 𝑞 > 0, 𝜔 > 0, 
  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1











The unconditional variance equation is: 
(12)                  𝜎𝑐
2 =
𝜔𝑐
1 − ∑ 𝛼𝑐,𝑖
𝑞





ω  is the intercept of the error variance equation; 
  is the coefficient on the conditional variance terms; 
  is the coefficient on the autoregressive terms; 
p  is the GARCH order;  
q  is the ARCH order; and 
c  is the commodity;  
𝑝 ≥ 0, 𝑞 > 0, 𝜔 > 0, 
  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1













CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to achieve normality of residuals, natural log transformations of price volatility 
measurements were made. The natural log was chosen over other transformations because of its 
simplicity.  After including the transformations there were eight measures of price volatility:  
change in price, absolute change in price, natural log of absolute change in price, absolute 
normalized change in price, natural log of absolute normalized change in price, standard 
deviation of price (5-day, rolling), natural log of standard deviation of price (5-day, rolling), and 
natural log of the ratio of prices (current week’s price divided by previous week’s price).  A 
variety of dependent variable transformations were tested because different applications of this 
study may require different measures of price volatility.  Models were constructed for all orders 
GARCH(1,1) to GARCH(4,4) for the nine dependent variables.  For soybeans, there were five 
dependent variables for which at least one GARCH order returns normal residuals; for corn, 
there was only one dependent variable with normal residuals (natural log of absolute normalized 
change in price).  The order selection based on AIC agreed with the order selection based on 
SBC for all orders of normally distributed residual except for soybean’s natural log of price ratio.  
Akaike’s Information Criteria and SBC suggest different orders for soybean’s natural log of 
price ratio because of the difference in how SBC and AIC discount goodness of fit by the 
number of parameters.  Because soybean’s natural log of price ratio has a model for AIC-
selected order and a model for SBC-selected order, six soybean models were estimated even 
though there were only five soybean dependent variables with normally distributed residuals.  
Table 1 shows the models indicated by AIC and SBC for each dependent variable.   
Dickey Fuller tests showed each measure of price volatility was stationary.  Durbin-




Durbin-Watson tests performed on the predicted dependent variables show autocorrelations 
persisted after the GARCH process.  This is acceptable, as the GARCH process fits predicted 
values to physical values.  Well-fitting predicted values are of similar shape to physical values.  
Portmanteau Q tests and Engle’s LM tests indicated heteroskedasticity for all orders 
GARCH(1,1) to GARCH(4,4); see Table 3 for corn and Table 4 for soybeans.  Q tests and 
Engle’s LM tests run on predicted dependent variables indicated the GARCH process had 
sufficiently accounted for heteroskedasticity; see Table 5 for corn and Table 6 for soybeans.  
Table 7 reflects the results for all seven models (one corn model and six soybean models).  As 
might be expected given the summary statistics presented in Table 8 and Table 9, all coefficients 
of institutional investment were positive, and most were statistically significant.   
Interpretation of Mean and Conditional Variance Equations 
All eight models returned positive effects of institutional investment on price volatility, 
and most effects were statistically significant.  The overall best corn model was GARCH(2,3) for 
the dependent variable natural log of the absolute normalized change in price.  The overall best 
soybean model is GARCH(2,3) for the dependent variable change in price.  The two information 
criteria were in agreement for each model.  The models’ respective results (given above and in 
Table 7) reflect the best estimations of institutional investment’s effect on price volatility.  These 
results imply a one-percentage point increase in NCOI’s share of total corn contracts is 
associated with a 2.75% increase in magnitude of day-to-day settlement prices for corn, even 
after accounting the rise in the price of corn over the 18-year period.   Corn’s NCOI coefficient is 
strongly significant, holding a p-value of less than 0.0001. The story in soybeans is less eye-
catching:  the NCOI coefficient for the best-fit model is not significant.  Additionally, soybean’s 




every percentage point increase in NCOI’s share of outstanding contracts.  The remainder of this 
section is a model-by-model breakdown of results for all models not discarded for non-normal 
residuals.   
In corn markets, when measuring price volatility by the natural log of absolute 
normalized change in price, a one percentage point increase (decrease) in NCOI, the percent of 
total OI held by noncommercials, was associated with a 0.0275 increase (decrease) in corn price 
volatility, shown in Table 7; point-A.  This effect was significant at p-value<0.0001.  For this 
measure of price volatility, a GARCH(2,3) order was indicated by both AIC and SBC.  The 
GARCH order selected indicates that price volatility was statistically significantly affected by 
the previous two weeks’ price volatility (GARCH2, p-value=0.0524), and the conditional error 
variance was statistically significantly affected by the previous week’s conditional error 
variances (ARCH1, p-value=0.0427.   
In soybean markets, when measuring price volatility by the change in price, a one 
percentage point increase (decrease) in NCOI was associated with a 0.0014 cent/bu increase 
(decrease) in average daily change in settlement price (Table 7; point-B).  This effect was not 
significant at the 10% level.  For this measure of price volatility, a GARCH(2,3) order was 
indicated by both AIC and SBC.  Price volatility was statistically significantly affected by the 
previous two weeks’ price volatility (GARCH2, p-value<0.0001), and the conditional error 
variance was statistically significantly affected by the previous two weeks’ conditional error 
variances (ARCH1, p-value<0.0001; ARCH2, p-value=0.0001).   
In soybean markets, when measuring price volatility by the natural log of the five-day 
standard deviation in price, a one percentage point increase (decrease) in NCOI was associated 




significant at a p-value<0.0001.  For this measure of price volatility, a GARCH(2,3) order was 
indicated by both AIC and SBC.  Price volatility was statistically significantly affected by the 
previous two weeks’ price volatility (GARCH2, p-value=0.0001).  The conditional error variance 
was statistically significantly affected by the previous three weeks’ conditional error variances 
but only at the 10% level (ARCH1, p-value=0.0798; ARCH2, p-value=0.093; ARCH3, p-
value=0.9489).   
In soybean markets, when measuring price volatility by the natural log of the absolute 
normalized change in price, a one percentage point increase (decrease) in NCOI was associated 
with a 0.0117 increase (decrease) in price volatility (Table 7; point-D).  This effect was 
significant at a p-value<0.0001.  For this measure of price volatility, a GARCH(2,4) order was 
indicated by both AIC and SBC.  Price volatility was statistically significantly affected by none 
of the previous week’s price volatility, but the conditional error variance was statistically 
significantly affected by the previous three weeks’ conditional error variances (ARCH1, p-
value=0.019; ARCH2, p-value=0.0699; and ARCH3, p-value=0.048).  
In soybean markets, when measuring price volatility by the natural log of the absolute 
change in price, a one percentage point increase (decrease) in NCOI was associated with a 
0.0245 increase (decrease) in price volatility (Table 7; point-E).  This effect was significant 
above p-value<0.0001.  For this measure of price volatility, a GARCH(2,4) order was indicated 
by both AIC and SBC.  Price volatility was statistically significantly affected by none of the 
previous week’s price volatility, and the conditional error variance was statistically significantly 
affected by the previous three weeks’ conditional error variances (ARCH1, p-value=0.0014; 




When measuring soybean price volatility as the natural log of the soybean price ratio, a 
GARCH(3,3) order was chosen under AIC.  Under this specification, the effect of NCOI was 
small and statistically insignificant (Table 7; point-F).  Price volatility was statistically 
significantly affected by the previous three weeks’ price volatility (GARCH3, p-value<0.0001), 
and the conditional error variance was statistically significantly affected by the previous week’s 
conditional error variances (ARCH1, p-value<0.0001).  A GARCH(3,1) order was indicated 
under SBC, resulting in a small and statistically insignificant effect of NCOI (Table 7; point-G).  
Again, price volatility was statistically significantly affected by the previous three weeks’ price 
volatility (GARCH3, p-value<0.0001), and the conditional error variance was statistically 






CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 It is possible to argue that a futures contract’s fundamental price – the price determined 
by the supply and demand of each commodity – has undergone a change in the 18-year period, 
that it has become more volatile because of market participants’ increased access to information 
by the climb to near-ubiquity of internet, cell phones, and social media.  If that is the case, a 
more volatile nominal price may be neither a surprise nor a concern.  Though, if either that is not 
the case or the increased pace of actionable intelligence has decreased price volatility, then 
greater uncertainty surrounding futures prices should beg the question of market stakeholders as 
to the cause.  In any case, the increase in the dispersion of futures prices means holding futures 
contracts for any purpose – hedging or speculating – has become a riskier endeavor.  Firms 
participating in agricultural futures markets might need to increase the speed with which orders 
are submitted in order to combat this risk.   
Existing literature agrees that results presented in this study may underestimate 
noncommercial’s effects because the COT’s noncommercial category does not capture 
speculative activity undertaken by commercial firms, firms the CFTC judges to be participating 
future markets largely for the purposes of hedging physical market activities.  A single firm can 
participate in both hedging and speculating activities, but – to all firms holding reportable 
positions – the CFTC assigns the firm a single designation:  commercial or noncommercial.  A 
firm can use this limitation of the CFTC to obfuscate its type of trading, allowing it to avoid the 
burdensome regulations on speculators (Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo, 2004).  As Sanders, 
Boris, and Manfredo (2004, p. 430-1) point out, the silver lining for study like this one is that the 




representation of speculation.  For this reason, there is an unambiguous implication that the true 
parameters may be larger than the estimates offered in this study. 
This study could be improved by including control variables to the multivariate GARCH 
models.  Variables like weather (e.g., those capturing the drought of 2012) and policy (e.g., those 
capturing the Renewable Fuels Standard) may further help to explain changes to price volatility.  
Indicator variables could be introduced to adjust the mean price volatility by year, controlling for 
time-trending unobserved factors.  Additional indicator variables could be introduced to account 
for intra-year seasonality, like those caused by the differences in susceptibility of crop prices to 
weather at different times during the growing season.  Another research direction would be to 
identify the causal mechanisms of institutional investment’s effects on commodity futures 
markets.  Such a direction may involve an adaption of Tang and Xiong (2012) and Buyuksahin 
and Robe (2014).  Institutional investment’s effects on the volatility of calendar spreads could 
also be examined.  Because of the large portion of noncommercials’ position in spreads, there 
may be effects particular to contango and backwardation. 
If an increase in institutional investment’s share of OI causes an increase in the variance 
of futures prices, then the most obvious question might be whether cash prices experience a 
similar increase in variance.  An examination of the effects of institutional investment on basis 
levels within a GARCH framework may shed light on this relationship.  Cash markets may 
experience the same alternating periods of calm and chaos that necessitate GARCH models and 
debase those which ignore heteroskedasticity.  If futures prices are more volatile but basis levels 
are not, the effects of institutional investment may reach into physical commodities markets, as 
this would imply basis is not compensating for the fluctuations in futures prices.  This question 
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Figure 2.  Share of total open interest for corn for noncommercial, commercial, and nonreportable traders from the CFTC’s COT, 

















Figure 3.  Share of total open interest for soybeans for noncommercial, commercial, and nonreportable traders from the CFTC’s COT, 


















Figure 4.  Share of corn total open interest for noncommercial traders by position from the CFTC’s COT, Futures-and-Options 

































Figure 5.  Share of soybean total open interest for noncommercial traders by position from the CFTC’s COT, Futures-and-Options 
































Figure 6. Weighted average corn and soybean futures price in dollars per bushel, nominal prices, Chicago Mercantile Exchange 















































Figure 7.  Change in weekly average weighted average price for corn and soybeans, nominal 




















































































































































































































































































Figure 8.  Absolute change in weekly average weighted average price for corn and soybeans, 



































































































































































































































































































Figure 9.  Absolute change in weekly average weighted average normalized price for corn and 




















































































































































































































































































































Figure 10.  Five-day rolling standard deviation of weighted average price for corn and soybeans, 

































































































































































































































































Table 1.  GARCH order selection using minimum AIC and 
minimum SBC 
  Order 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in corn price  
AIC GARCH(2,3) 
SBC GARCH(2,3) 
Change in soybean price 
AIC GARCH(2,3) 
SBC GARCH(2,3) 
Natural log of the five-day standard deviation of soybean price 
AIC GARCH(2,3) 
SBC GARCH(2,3) 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in soybean price 
AIC GARCH(2,4) 
SBC GARCH(2,4) 
Natural log of absolute change in soybean price 
AIC GARCH(2,4) 
SBC GARCH(2,4) 








Table 2.  Durbin-Watson Statistics by commodity and dependent variable 
Order DW Pr<DW Pr>DW 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in corn price, corn 
1 1.2561 <.0001 1 
2 1.3079 <.0001 1 
3 1.3419 <.0001 1 
4 1.4594 <.0001 1 
Change in soybean price, soybeans 
1 1.3296 <.0001 1 
2 1.9357 0.1582 0.8418 
3 2.0056 0.5485 0.4515 
4 2.0512 0.8067 0.1933 
Natural log of the five-day standard deviation of soybean price, soybeans 
1 1.3639 <.0001 1 
2 1.3456 <.0001 1 
3 1.2992 <.0001 1 
4 1.3532 <.0001 1 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in soybean price, soybeans 
1 1.3007 <.0001 1 
2 1.3652 <.0001 1 
3 1.4084 <.0001 1 
4 1.4101 <.0001 1 
Natural log of absolute change in soybean price, soybeans 
1 0.994 <.0001 1 
2 1.0644 <.0001 1 
3 1.1004 <.0001 1 
4 1.112 <.0001 1 
Natural log of soybean price ratio,  AIC order selection, soybeans 
1 1.3955 <.0001 1 
2 1.9284 0.1322 0.8678 
3 1.9333 0.1571 0.8429 
4 1.977 0.3854 0.6146 
Natural log of soybean price ratio, SBC order selection, soybeans 
1 1.3955 <.0001 1 
2 1.9284 0.1322 0.8678 
3 1.9333 0.1571 0.8429 






Table 3.  Q test and Engle's LM test for heteroskedasticity for 
natural log of absolute normalized change in price, corn 
Order Q Pr > Q LM Pr > LM 
1 11.5003 0.0007 11.3102 0.0008 
2 20.6013 <.0001 18.1814 0.0001 
3 26.9685 <.0001 21.8974 <.0001 
4 27.423 <.0001 21.8998 0.0002 
5 32.0975 <.0001 24.7438 0.0002 
6 32.11 <.0001 24.9777 0.0003 
7 35.0439 <.0001 26.7286 0.0004 
8 36.3038 <.0001 27.0267 0.0007 
9 36.3813 <.0001 27.5662 0.0011 
10 36.9189 <.0001 28.8436 0.0013 
11 37.2926 0.0001 29.4243 0.0019 






Table 4.  Q test and Engle's LM test for heteroskedasticity by 
dependent variable, soybeans 
Order Q Pr>Q LM Pr>LM 
Change in price       
1 64.5653 <.0001 64.4533 <.0001 
2 106.989 <.0001 85.5876 <.0001 
3 161.416 <.0001 110.0781 <.0001 
4 257.249 <.0001 154.2817 <.0001 
5 321.5691 <.0001 166.5508 <.0001 
6 357.6477 <.0001 167.9935 <.0001 
7 422.1173 <.0001 179.6159 <.0001 
8 485.365 <.0001 185.5989 <.0001 
9 517.4216 <.0001 185.5992 <.0001 
10 552.693 <.0001 186.5524 <.0001 
11 633.1296 <.0001 201.247 <.0001 
12 672.4511 <.0001 201.2665 <.0001 
Natural log of standard deviation (5-day)   
1 10.6598 0.0011 10.5421 0.0012 
2 20.4797 <.0001 18.4226 <.0001 
3 34.6705 <.0001 28.6501 <.0001 
4 37.269 <.0001 29.1655 <.0001 
5 39.825 <.0001 29.7911 <.0001 
6 47.395 <.0001 33.8546 <.0001 
7 47.4151 <.0001 34.302 <.0001 
8 49.5859 <.0001 35.0406 <.0001 
9 57.6066 <.0001 39.6309 <.0001 
10 57.6127 <.0001 40.3165 <.0001 
11 60.3243 <.0001 41.2271 <.0001 
12 63.5578 <.0001 42.1506 <.0001 
Natural log of normalized change in price 
1 23.4658 <.0001 23.0395 <.0001 
2 39.9111 <.0001 34.0022 <.0001 
3 49.6209 <.0001 38.209 <.0001 
4 50.7243 <.0001 38.219 <.0001 
5 52.395 <.0001 38.5582 <.0001 
6 52.4314 <.0001 38.6947 <.0001 
7 53.7976 <.0001 39.5735 <.0001 
8 54.9912 <.0001 40.0666 <.0001 
9 55.0181 <.0001 40.4444 <.0001 
10 56.1571 <.0001 41.1083 <.0001 
11 56.1672 <.0001 41.1559 <.0001 





Table 4 (continued).  Q test and Engle's LM test for 
heteroskedasticity by dependent variable, soybeans 
Order Q Pr>Q LM Pr>LM 
 
Natural log of absolute change in price 
1 79.3848 <.0001 78.8151 <.0001 
2 125.856 <.0001 98.6182 <.0001 
3 169.5274 <.0001 113.2773 <.0001 
4 195.3947 <.0001 116.409 <.0001 
5 208.4113 <.0001 116.6599 <.0001 
6 212.0692 <.0001 117.1857 <.0001 
7 215.7084 <.0001 117.2244 <.0001 
8 221.469 <.0001 118.4833 <.0001 
9 223.8995 <.0001 118.5378 <.0001 
10 227.179 <.0001 119.0917 <.0001 
11 230.205 <.0001 119.3228 <.0001 
12 236.6396 <.0001 121.1016 <.0001 
Natural log of price ratio (AIC-selected order)   
1 25.3625 <.0001 25.363 <.0001 
2 30.0521 <.0001 27.2677 <.0001 
3 38.2995 <.0001 32.8333 <.0001 
4 67.2455 <.0001 53.7107 <.0001 
5 71.9837 <.0001 53.9738 <.0001 
6 74.5697 <.0001 54.398 <.0001 
7 82.5247 <.0001 57.5596 <.0001 
8 94.8519 <.0001 61.3401 <.0001 
9 105.0001 <.0001 64.7247 <.0001 
10 117.3607 <.0001 69.3565 <.0001 
11 126.9488 <.0001 70.9853 <.0001 
12 135.0698 <.0001 72.0185 <.0001 
Natural log of price ratio (SBC-selected order)   
1 25.3625 <.0001 25.363 <.0001 
2 30.0521 <.0001 27.2677 <.0001 
3 38.2995 <.0001 32.8333 <.0001 
4 67.2455 <.0001 53.7107 <.0001 
5 71.9837 <.0001 53.9738 <.0001 
6 74.5697 <.0001 54.398 <.0001 
7 82.5247 <.0001 57.5596 <.0001 
8 94.8519 <.0001 61.3401 <.0001 
9 105.0001 <.0001 64.7247 <.0001 
10 117.3607 <.0001 69.3565 <.0001 
11 126.9488 <.0001 70.9853 <.0001 





Table 5.  Q test and Engle's LM test for 
heteroskedasticity after GARCH process by 
dependent variable, corn 
Order Q Pr > Q LM Pr > LM 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in 
price 
1 1.0467 0.3063 1.045 0.3067 
2 1.0884 0.5803 1.0749 0.5842 
3 1.7948 0.6161 1.7646 0.6227 
4 2.3062 0.6796 2.3479 0.6721 
5 2.6318 0.7565 2.7283 0.7418 
6 2.7849 0.8353 2.8477 0.8277 
7 3.6149 0.8229 3.6739 0.8165 
8 3.6297 0.8889 3.7322 0.8804 
9 3.8154 0.9231 3.9112 0.9172 
10 4.8898 0.8984 4.9472 0.8947 
11 5.0615 0.9282 5.0965 0.9264 








Table 6.  Q test and Engle's LM test for heteroskedasticity after GARCH 
process by dependent variable, soybeans 
Order Q Pr > Q LM Pr > LM 
Change in price 
1 0.6058 0.4364 0.6046 0.4368 
2 2.0245 0.3634 1.9744 0.3726 
3 4.8811 0.1807 4.6343 0.2006 
4 57.1989 <.0001 55.1612 <.0001 
5 63.0455 <.0001 59.6479 <.0001 
6 64.8414 <.0001 60.2814 <.0001 
7 86.1468 <.0001 75.3271 <.0001 
8 92.6688 <.0001 75.8613 <.0001 
9 94.8135 <.0001 75.9101 <.0001 
10 94.8776 <.0001 76.4384 <.0001 
11 258.3 <.0001 196.75 <.0001 
12 259.989 <.0001 196.771 <.0001 
Natural log of the five-day standard deviation of price 
1 7.1673 0.0074 7.1588 0.0075 
2 7.2102 0.0272 7.1592 0.0279 
3 8.8169 0.0318 8.7471 0.0328 
4 8.865 0.0646 8.9296 0.0629 
5 8.9841 0.1097 9.0081 0.1087 
6 10.0065 0.1244 10.066 0.1219 
7 10.0352 0.1866 10.1588 0.1797 
8 10.556 0.2281 10.7927 0.2137 
9 11.6646 0.2329 11.507 0.2425 
10 12.7722 0.2367 12.8705 0.231 
11 12.898 0.3 12.9043 0.2996 






Table 6 (continued).  Q test and Engle's LM test for heteroskedasticity after 
GARCH process by dependent variable, soybeans 
Order           Q                      Pr>Q              LM                      PR>LM  
Natural log of absolute normalized change in price 
1 0.1067 0.744 0.1054 0.7455 
2 0.4038 0.8172 0.3965 0.8202 
3 0.4039 0.9394 0.3965 0.941 
4 0.4353 0.9795 0.4313 0.9798 
5 0.4694 0.9932 0.4638 0.9934 
6 0.4929 0.9979 0.4839 0.998 
7 0.5168 0.9994 0.5045 0.9994 
8 0.5168 0.9998 0.5045 0.9999 
9 0.5211 1 0.5082 1 
10 0.5269 1 0.5138 1 
11 0.5374 1 0.5236 1 
12 0.5796 1 0.5631 1 
Natural log of absolute change in price 
1 6.8161 0.009 6.7985 0.0091 
2 11.4219 0.0033 10.532 0.0052 
3 13.4058 0.0038 11.705 0.0085 
4 13.5456 0.0089 11.7076 0.0197 
5 13.6983 0.0176 11.7495 0.0384 
6 13.6985 0.0332 11.7663 0.0674 
7 13.7366 0.0561 11.8194 0.1067 
8 13.7434 0.0887 11.831 0.1589 
9 13.7564 0.1313 11.8496 0.2219 
10 13.7564 0.1844 11.8497 0.2952 
11 13.7637 0.2463 11.8557 0.3746 





Table 6 (continued).  Q test and Engle's LM test for heteroskedasticity after 
GARCH process by dependent variable, soybeans  
Order           Q                      Pr>Q               LM                      Pr>LM 
Natural log of price ratio,  AIC order selection 
1 0.1816 0.67 0.1815 0.6701 
2 0.185 0.9116 0.1854 0.9115 
3 0.2154 0.9751 0.2167 0.9748 
4 18.6075 0.0009 18.4735 0.001 
5 18.6088 0.0023 18.4956 0.0024 
6 18.6099 0.0049 18.4985 0.0051 
7 18.9506 0.0083 18.7984 0.0088 
8 20.4532 0.0088 19.1939 0.0139 
9 21.2031 0.0118 19.9606 0.0182 
10 21.4855 0.018 20.2138 0.0273 
11 35.6499 0.0002 33.2698 0.0005 
12 36.8876 0.0002 33.8984 0.0007 
Natural log of price ratio, SBC order selection 
1 0.1842 0.6678 0.184 0.6679 
2 0.1875 0.9105 0.1879 0.9103 
3 0.2182 0.9746 0.2195 0.9744 
4 18.7585 0.0009 18.6231 0.0009 
5 18.7599 0.0021 18.6456 0.0022 
6 18.7606 0.0046 18.6479 0.0048 
7 19.1034 0.0079 18.9497 0.0083 
8 20.6232 0.0082 19.3479 0.0131 
9 21.3837 0.0111 20.1255 0.0172 
10 21.6594 0.0169 20.3734 0.0259 
11 35.8863 0.0002 33.4833 0.0004 





  Table 7.  GARCH estimates by dependent variable and commodity 
Variable DF Estimate St Err t value P-value 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in corn price, GARCH(2,3) 
Intercept 1 -0.9122 0.0781 -11.69 <.0001 
NCOI 1 0.0275 (A*) 0.00222 12.37 <.0001 
ARCH0 1 0.0862 0.0508 1.7 0.0898 
ARCH1 1 0.1025 0.0506 2.03 0.0427 
ARCH2 1 0.0467 0.0378 1.24 0.2163 
ARCH3 1 0.0196 0.0682 0.29 0.7734 
GARCH2 1 0.49 0.2526 1.94 0.0524 
Change in soybean price, GARCH(2,3) 
Intercept 1 -0.0406 0.0343 -1.19 0.2359 
NCOI 1 0.001359 (B) 0.00095 1.43 0.1525 
ARCH0 1 0.000815 0.000399 2.05 0.0408 
ARCH1 1 0.1955 0.0493 3.97 <.0001 
ARCH2 1 0.0932 0.0243 3.83 0.0001 
ARCH3 1 -0.061 0.0532 -1.15 0.2513 
GARCH2 1 0.7672 0.0455 16.88 <.0001 
Natural log of the five-day standard deviation of soybean price, 
GARCH(2,3) 
Intercept 1 -4.7903 0.1322 -36.24 <.0001 
NCOI 1 0.0585 (C) 0.003434 17.04 <.0001 
ARCH0 1 0.0816 0.0507 1.61 0.1077 
ARCH1 1 0.0786 0.0449 1.75 0.0798 
ARCH2 1 0.0654 0.039 1.68 0.093 
ARCH3 1 -0.003683 0.0575 -0.06 0.9489 
GARCH2 1 0.6601 0.1734 3.81 0.0001 
Natural log of absolute normalized change in soybean price, 
GARCH(2,4) 
Intercept 1 -5.1383 0.094 -54.68 <.0001 
NCOI 1 0.0117 (D) 0.002461 4.75 <.0001 
ARCH0 1 0.1023 0.0346 2.96 0.0031 
ARCH1 1 0.1211 0.0516 2.35 0.019 
ARCH2 1 0.0898 0.0495 1.81 0.0699 
ARCH3 1 0.111 0.0561 1.98 0.048 
ARCH4 1 -0.0212 0.0439 -0.48 0.6294 
GARCH2 1 0.2362 0.2022 1.17 0.2426 
Natural log of absolute change in soybean price, GARCH(2,4) 
Intercept 1 -2.0974 0.045 -46.56 <.0001 
NCOI 1 0.0245 (E) 0.001178 20.83 <.0001 
ARCH0 1 0.0264 0.008339 3.16 0.0016 
ARCH1 1 0.1929 0.0606 3.18 0.0014 
ARCH2 1 0.0856 0.0532 1.61 0.1077 
ARCH3 1 0.1479 0.0636 2.32 0.0201 
ARCH4 1 0.0866 0.0679 1.27 0.2024 





















Table 7 (continued).  GARCH estimates by dependent variable and 
commodity  
Variable      DF        Estimate          St Err          t value          P-value             
Natural log of soybean price ratio,  AIC order selection, GARCH(3,3) 
Intercept 1 -0.1184 0.2145 -0.55 0.5809 
NCOI 1 0.004662 (F) 0.005606 0.83 0.4056 
ARCH0 1 0.1433 0.0512 2.8 0.0051 
ARCH1 1 0.1577 0.0346 4.56 <.0001 
ARCH2 1 0.0352 0.0254 1.39 0.1657 
ARCH3 1 0.0323 0.0273 1.18 0.2366 
GARCH3 1 0.6669 0.0684 9.75 <.0001 
Natural log of soybean price ratio, SBC order selection, GARCH(3,1) 
Intercept 1 -0.1414 0.2211 -0.64 0.5224 
NCOI 1 0.005257 (G) 0.005792 0.91 0.3641 
ARCH0 1 0.097 0.037 2.62 0.0087 
ARCH1 1 0.1391 0.0296 4.71 <.0001 
GARCH3 1 0.7875 0.0455 17.29 <.0001 
Note:  ARCH terms are coefficients on autoregressive terms; GARCH 
terms are coefficients on conditional variance terms. 




Table 8. Summary statistics for corn and soybeans, percent of open interest for noncommercial, commercial, and nonreportable 
traders from the CFTC’s COT, Futures-and-Options Combined reports, 1995-2013 
Corn 
  1995-2006 2007-2013 1995-2013 
  OI NC C NR OI NC C NR OI NC C NR 
Mean 665,486 29% 47% 24% 1,758,781 43% 44% 13% 1,070,701 34% 46% 20% 
Min 351,111 17% 39% 13% 1,091,888 33% 35% 10% 351,111 17% 35% 10% 
Max 2,067,296 42% 54% 36% 2,573,509 52% 51% 17% 2,573,509 52% 54% 36% 
StDev 325,945 5% 3% 5% 321,717 3% 3% 1% 619,859 8% 3% 7% 
Kurtosis 5.16 -0.30 -0.57 -0.96 -0.42 0.43 1.30 -0.54 -1.18 -1.15 0.37 -0.93 
Skewness 2.29 0.37 -0.11 0.26 0.18 0.12 -0.74 -0.06 0.54 0.15 -0.27 0.50 
Obs. 613 613 613 613 361 361 361 361 974 974 974 974 
             Soybeans 
  1995-2006 2007-2013 1995-2013 
  OI NC C NR OI NC C NR OI NC C NR 
Mean 268,939 34% 42% 24% 731,969 44% 45% 11% 440,555 38% 43% 19% 
Min 158,430 23% 29% 14% 379,052 36% 37% 7% 158,430 23% 29% 7% 
Max 550,854 43% 52% 38% 1,259,806 54% 51% 16% 1,259,806 54% 52% 38% 
StDev 81,679 4% 4% 5% 180,263 4% 2% 2% 257,452 6% 4% 8% 
Kurtosis 0.71 -0.38 0.11 -0.50 0.19 -0.58 0.15 -1.20 -0.11 -0.72 0.78 -0.98 
Skewness 1.18 0.01 -0.47 0.45 0.60 0.27 -0.19 0.15 0.94 0.29 -0.78 0.18 
Obs. 613 613 613 613 361 361 361 361 974 974 974 974 





Table 9. Summary statistics for corn and soybean weighted average price, weekly returns, absolute weekly returns and percent 
change in absolute weekly returns, 1995-2013 
 
Corn 
  1995-2006 2007-2013 1995-2013 
  Price Returns Abs(R) % Change Price Returns Abs(R) % Change Price Returns Abs(R) % Change 
Mean 2.54 0.00 0.05 0.02 5.21 0.00 0.15 0.03 3.53 0.00 0.09 0.02 
Min 1.88 -0.33 0.00 0.00 3.23 -0.75 0.00 0.00 1.88 -0.75 0.00 0.00 
Max 4.23 0.22 0.33 0.10 8.09 0.69 0.75 0.15 8.09 0.69 0.75 0.15 
StDev 0.45 0.07 0.05 0.02 1.32 0.20 0.13 0.02 1.56 0.13 0.10 0.02 
Kurtosis 1.66 1.73 3.69 2.54 -1.27 1.88 4.07 3.64 0.14 6.37 10.51 4.78 
Skewness 1.41 0.15 1.66 1.45 0.29 -0.12 1.83 1.64 1.14 -0.16 2.77 1.79 
Obs 613 612 612 612 361 361 361 361 974 973 973 973 
             Soybeans 
  1995-2006 2007-2013 1995-2013 
  Price Returns Abs(R) % Change Price Returns Abs(R) % Change Price Returns Abs(R) % Change 
Mean 6.01 0.00 0.12 0.02 11.68 0.02 0.27 0.02 8.11 0.01 0.17 0.02 
Min 4.23 -0.76 0.00 0.00 6.76 -1.43 0.00 0.00 4.23 -1.43 0.00 0.00 
Max 9.82 0.61 0.76 0.10 16.97 0.91 1.43 0.15 16.97 0.91 1.43 0.15 
StDev 1.12 0.15 0.10 0.02 2.30 0.35 0.22 0.02 3.20 0.24 0.17 0.02 
Kurtosis -0.02 2.30 5.92 3.26 -1.03 1.19 3.85 5.84 -0.58 3.72 7.67 5.01 
Skewness 0.66 -0.11 1.99 1.52 -0.12 -0.52 1.56 1.69 0.83 -0.50 2.24 1.65 
Obs 613 612 612 612 361 361 361 361 974 973 973 973 
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